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Book Reviews

Baring the Bear

The New KGB: Engine of Soviet Power, by William Corson and Robert T. Crowley, Morrow, New York, 1985, 560 pages, \$19.95.

careful reading of *The New KGB* identifies US nuclear triad and ASW (antisubmarine warfare) capability as priority targets for espionage penetration. Soviet intelligence organs have set their sights on our military, our Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel, and on those weapons designed to negate their strategic defenses. Obviously, these are the areas that possess the highest potential for fatal damage to their country.


This book is full of truths about the KGB: truths that when applied to current affairs make it difficult to escape conclusions otherwise muddied by external events. For instance, who directed the attempt on the life of the Pope? Assassin Agca's recent statements in the Rome courtroom leave it in doubt. The New KGB leaves little room for such doubt. From the founding days of the Cheka to the present, the KGB "center" has maintained absolute control over such operations, which by definition are coordinated at the highest levels of the KGB, and sometimes higher.

Is the information presented about the KGB new? "Experts" will disagree. That fact alone should tell us that what little is known is too seldom factored into espionage events, even by the spy literati. The first Soviet intelligence residencies abroad were trade offices set up by the intelligence arm of the Red Army with the conviction that industrial technology and superior weaponry were synonymous. But our own military intelligence services would normally shun going after industrial godies, so long have we enjoyed technological primacy. Statements that a CIA officer is lower on the list of choice targets than a staffer on Capitol Hill may suprise many. Yet it follows from the codex of KGB targeting that CIA officers, while they may know much about Soviet hardware, seldom specialize in Pentagon weaponry.

Increasingly, practitioners of the "art" realize that the amount of accurate data on espionage cases residing in the public domain usually exceeds that in the classified files. The critical task is the accurate sorting of it.

The authors demonstrate their skill at this with sharply drawn accountings of numerous intriguing and sometimes little-known KGB operations as a backdrop to defining the role of the KGB. And their contention is, "The party, supported by the KGB and the armed forces, no longer retains its comforting primus inter partes symmetry. The KGB now operates the USSR...."

The book also raises numerous questions for serious reflection. As espionage moves into the 21st Century, our technology will undoubtedly provide us with new skills for observing and transmitting critical intelligence. Will the keen mind of the



intelligence officer discover new means of recruiting sources? The authors' constant reference to "the unplanned event" suggests that major spy cases on all sides will continue to occur more because of the whims and foibles of human nature than by any grand design.

Will there be other new and startling intelligence discoveries? A breakthrough, as the book suggests, may come in combining ultra-tech collection with a sharper vision for identifying our future intelligence needs. As the KGB began pointing its boney collection finger at our industrial secrets more than two decades ago, at a time when we were striving to find a way to identify their then nonexistent ICBMs, so might our intelligence services be glancing ahead. We should already be asking ourselves from where news on the Soviet defense against our ballistic missile defense (SDI) will come and planning for operations that will produce that intelligence.

By their expert research and scholarship the authors distinguish themselves from those who provide interesting recollections about intelligence activity from on high. William Corson and Robert Crowley, in tandem, have become two of the free world's top authorities on their subject. As one reader recently informed them during a radio interview, "Your book is rather remarkable. It would be well for all of us if it were read by the Members of the United States Congress."

Frank Sommers

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